ABSTRACT
Principal-agent models, derived from such disparate disciplines as law, finance, accounting, and economics, have become the basis for an extensive set of studies relating bureaucracy to elected officials (see Mitnick 1973 Mitnick , 1975 Mitnick , and 1980 Moe 1982 Moe , 1984 Moe , and 1985 Wood 1988; Wood and Waterman 1991 , 1993 Scholz and Wei 1986) . Such models also have been extended to presidents' decisions to use force (Downs and Rocke 1994) and to the Supreme Court and its relationship to lower courts (Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994) . Despite this outpouring of research, few studies have directly examined the basic terminology and assumptions of the principalagent model. In this article our objectives are to examine principal-agent theory critically, to relax some of its restrictive assumptions, and in the process to present a more general theory of relationships between the bureaucracy and its political environment. Although our critique may be relevant to other uses of the principal-agent model, we limit our assessment to its use as a J-PART 8(1998):2:173-202 theory of bureaucracy.
THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
Despite the widespread referencing of the principal-agent model, only in rare instances does a researcher actually discuss the model and how its assumptions fit the problem to be studied. For this reason it is useful to review the model in its various incarnations and to examine its basic assumptions. The principalagent model, as applied in such disciplines as sociology, political science, and public administration, is in essence a theory about contractual relationships between buyers and sellers (see Ross 1973; Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985) . As described by Charles Perrow: In its simplest form, agency theory assumes that social life is a series of contracts. Conventionally, one member, the 'buyer' of goods or services is designated the 'principal,' and the other, who provides the goods or service is the 'agent'-hence the term 'agency theory.' The principal-agent relationship is governed by a contract specifying what the agent should do and what the principal must do in return. (1986, 224) A common application in economics is the market for professional services, say between a patient-the principal-and a physician-the agent (Evans 1980) . Assuming that both are rational utility maximizers, a patient and a physician are likely to have different goals. The patient would like to be made healthy but pay as little as possible. The physician would be interested in income so, therefore, faces the temptation to provide more medical services than are necessary or to charge a higher price than is warranted. In this exchange, patients are at a disadvantage because they cannot directly evaluate the services provided by the physician. In short, an information asymmetry exists, with an advantage to the physician. Principals seek to manipulate and mold the behavior of agents so that they will act in a manner consistent with the principals' preferences. The contractual arrangement is one tool for accomplishing this goal.
The contractual arrangement played an important role in Mitnick's (1973 and 1975) formulation of an institutional or regulatory principal-agent model. Rather than focus on buyers and sellers in an exchange, Mitnick examined the relationship between agents in the regulatory bureaucracy and their political principals (e.g., legislators and interest groups). Mitnick's (1980, 146) framework included "a typology of agency relationships generated from such dimensions as the level of consent between agent and principal regarding the agent's actions (e.g., whether or not a contract exists, a contract which may be formal or informal), the source of specification of the agent's acts .... and the level of discretion possessed by the agent." Mitnick noted that agents could be motivated by the public interest or by their own narrow self-interest. Since agents enjoy information advantages over their political principals, he added, "The regulators are thus seen as agents to be policed to adherence to the 'public interest* goals of some principal 'public.'" But "such policing is not costless. . . . Principals must pay specification costs to identify acts of the agent that would satisfy the principal's preferences, and policing costs in monitoring and enforcing compliance" (p. 150). Given the existence of these costs, Mitnick concluded (p. 151), "The rational principal attempts policing only if he expects a net return ... We suggest that because of bounded rationality and information costs, not to speak of fundamental problems in valuation, the return to the given public interest criteria may be more difficult to measure and predict than certain obvious indicators wrongly assumed to be correlated with return to that interest." In other words, in the principal-agent relationship there is an "inevitability of control loss" phenomenon (p. 17).
The idea that costs are involved in monitoring an agent, and that principals rationally can decide not to monitor their agents' behavior, explains why the public interest is so often made subservient to private interests in the regulatory arena (one of the main concerns of the regulatory literature). It also raises an important distinction between the economic and the institutional or regulatory principal-agent models. In the institutional model, if a political principal such as the legislature decides that it is not in its rational self-interest to police or monitor its bureaucratic agents, that principal is unlikely to directly bear any cost incurred by the agent's continued shirking. Instead, the bulk of that cost is passed along to the general public, which in a democracy is the legislative branch's political principal. Legislators would pay only a direct cost for their lax oversight of the bureaucracy if the public became aware of it (e.g., if there were a scandal) and sought retribution against legislators at the polls. On the other hand, in the economic model, if the buyer did not adequately monitor the agent's behavior, then the buyer (i.e., the principal) would directly bear the cost, for example, by paying higher fees for services rendered. Likewise, as Mitnick notes, the nature of the contractual arrangement in the regulatory arena can be either formal or informal, whereas formal contracts would be more likely to be adopted in the market-place setting. As these examples demonstrate, important differences emerge once we begin to apply the principal-agent model from market place transactions to the regulatory arena.
When political scientists first applied principal-agent theory to bureaucratic settings, further differences emerged from the economic model. In its new formulation, as with buyers and sellers, it is assumed that politicians (principals) and bureaucrats (agents) do not necessarily share similar goals, or to use Mitnick's (1986, 4) terminology, "have potentially differing preferences. . . ." If we assume that they are rational utility maximizers (politicians maximizing reelection chances and bureaucrats maximizing budgets), politicians have an interest in policies that benefit their constituents but have no interest in paying excessively for them. Because politicians and political coalitions change over time and bureaucracies develop separate interests through institutionalization and changing external relationships, a potential conflict occurs when the goals and objectives of principals and agents are at odds.
Over time politicians may seek to alter established policy toward their preferred objectives, which may or may not be the same as those of the original legislation or political coalition. Bureaucratic interests also diverge from the original policy through time as politicians develop expertise about how the policy should be implemented or gain support from constituencies that favor different approaches. Even if no policy disagreement exists, principal-agent theory suggests that bureaucrats are likely to shirk, to produce outputs at a higher than needed cost, or to produce a level of outputs that is lower than desired.
Agency theory posits a dynamic process of interaction between principals and agents, which develops through time. In this process, bureaucrats are assumed to have distinct informational and expertise advantages over politicians. They better understand the policy and the organizational procedures that are required to implement it. They have both the opportunity and the incentive to manipulate politicians and processes for political gain (see Niskanen 1971; Miller and Moe 1983) . For some policies, especially those of a technical nature, bureaucracies are more knowledgeable about organizational needs than politicians are, so politicians are reluctant to intervene. Therefore, the key question for agency theory is, How can politicians vested with contemporaneous legitimacy overcome these uncertainties and the bureaucracy's inherent tendency to shirk? (See Wood and Waterman 1994, 22-26.) The information asymmetry between the principal and agent is at the heart of this question (Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen 1985 and 1987) , as is the bureaucracy's uncertainty about the attention of the politician. As Perrow (1986, 224) observed, "the principal-agent model is [thus] fraught with the problems of cheating, limited information, and bounded rationality in general." Hence, the probability of shirking increases if the preferences of principals and agents diverge, if there are high levels of uncertainty, or if the agent has a distinct information advantage. Under these circumstances, the principal must reduce uncertainty by acquiring offsetting information, which as Mitnick (1980) noted is not a costless undertaking.
Given these problems, how, according to agency theory, can principals achieve their goal of controlling their bureaucratic agents? First, principal control is possible because elected officials create bureaucracies and can design them with various incentive structures to facilitate control (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989) . Second, political principals monitor the activities of their bureaucratic agents . When bureaucratic activities stray from the principal's preferences, policy makers can apply sanctions or rewards to bring agents back into line (Mitnick 1980) .
The two key elements of the principal-agent model as it has been applied to the bureaucracy are goal conflict and information asymmetry; they are the spark plugs that power the theory. Because there is goal conflict between principals and agents, agents have the incentive to shirk (or engage in other nonsanctioned actions). The information asymmetry allows bureaucrats to be unresponsive to agents. Even in a case where there are relatively similar goals, conflict may exist over the exact means to use with an agent's desire to obtain slack resources that provide the incentive and the information asymmetry that provides the opportunity to shirk (see Mitnick 1975) .
While this principal-agent model has been well articulated (see Moe 1982 Moe , 1984 Moe , and 1985 , its assumptions rarely have been analyzed. The principal-agent literature in political science has paid little attention to these key elements, contending only that they exist and then going on to the other empirical questions at hand. Information and goal conflict both are treated as constants in the model, with little change over time or across settings. As a result the theory becomes static rather than dynamic (see Mitnick 1986, 26) and may force the analyst to frame questions in an inappropriate manner. There are additional concerns as well. Barry Mitnick, who as we have noted played a key role in introducing principal-agent models to political science, has been critical of their application. With regard to the risk and information stream of the principal-agent model, which besides the information asymmetry also involves the issues of "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" (see Wood and Waterman 1994, 24) , Mitnick noted (1986, 11-12) that it is "not as yet adequate organizational theory. There are only two or three parties; multiple agents are similar or treated in a very simplified way.
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There is virtually no organization structure. Organization variables are collapsed into decision theoretic variables." "As a result," Mitnick concludes, "die risk and information stream appears very far indeed from developing an agency approach to organizations; there is more to organizational life than choice under risk and uncertainty." Mitnick then adds, "Certainly the agency approach is adaptable to organizations, but we need to face up to the fact that we are dealing with organizations, not superior-subordinate dyads" (p. 24). His advice is particularly relevant to our analysis, since our focus is on bureaucratic politics. In assessing the assumptions of the principal-agent model, we therefore should be concerned with organizations and not just the interaction between bureaucrats and relevant politicians.
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS AS DYADS
As Mitnick (1991) noted, in dealing with organizations we should be interested in more than simple "superior-subordinate dyads." On this point Terry Moe (1987, 482) wrote, "The simple principal-agent model focuses for convenience on one principal and one agent, highlighting the determinants of control in dyadic relationships." But such a dyadic relationship is unrealistic. Moe continued:
In fact, the agency finds itself surrounded by multiple principals: various authorizing and appropriations committees in both houses of Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, the president and members of his White House staff, and departmental units in the executive branch. These principals compete for influence over the agency-which as a result finds itself under crosspressures, forced to make compromises and trade-offs favoring some principals over others, and, in its own self-interest, attracted to strategies that play principals off against one another.
A simple dyadic principal-agent model is incapable of capturing this dynamic interaction between multiple principals and a set of bureaucratic agents. The basic principal-agent model does allow agents to have multiple principals but generally rules out any externalities. That is, principal A by hiring agent B does not infringe on the interests of principal C who also hires agent B. Relationships between political institutions and bureaucracy are interesting in large part because the relationships generate externalities. In a political system built around checks and balances, those same checks and balances show up in bureaucratic politics.
The more astute principal-agent studies allow for multiple principals (Wood and Waterman 1991 , 1993 Scholz and Wei 1986; Moe 1987) . Congress, the courts, and the president are most frequently introduced, but if we relax the unrealistic notion that only elected officials seek to control the bureaucracy, as we will do shortly, the principal-agent logic could also be used to designate interest groups, other federal agencies (the Office of Management and Budget), and other policy actors as principals. Similarly within an agency, implementation level bureaucrats could well have principal-agent relationships with their superiors, the head of the regional office, or the head of a state agency (see Mitnick and Backoff 1984) . With the introduction of the federal system (Wood 1992; Scholz and Wei 1986 ) the number of relationships multiplies rapidly. In a recent study of the EPA's NPDES program, Waterman, Wright, and Rouse (1994) identified fourteen possible principals (including the president, Congress, the state and federal courts, governors, state legislators, purposive and material interest groups, the media, the regulatory industry, and public opinion) participating in the policy process. Each one was rated by implementation bureaucrats as having some influence over actual policy.
If we permit multiple principals and allow that the relationship between principals and agents might be characterized by externalities, what are the implications for the study of bureaucracy? First, the existence of multiple principals strongly indicates that not all the principals will agree on goals. Goal conflict among principals makes the relationship between principals and agents exceedingly complex. If the EPA cannot implement the goals of the Republican Reagan administration without ignoring the goals of the Democratic-controlled Congress, then the logic of the principal-agent model begins to break down. No matter how well the monitoring systems are designed or how well the principals structure the incentives, one or perhaps both of the principals will be dissatisfied with the relationship. In this case, as Mitnick (1986, 15) noted, agents must choose between different principal goals. In so doing, Mitnick asks, will they "choose the first principal encountered, the most cognitively salient one, the easiest to perceive and understand. . . . Will the agents choose goals that are standardized, or simplified, or the ones most like their own?" From the perspective of the bureaucracy, the notion of conflicting policy goals is not unusual. The political process rarely resolves all the disputes that force an issue on the political agenda; actors not satisfied with the macro political process are quite likely to continue to press their goals on the bureaucracy (Freeman 1956; Rourke 1984; Truman 1952) . As Waterman, Wright, and Rouse (1994) reveal, bureaucracies are caught in a web of conflicting goals espoused by Congress, the president, federal courts, the media, regulatees, environmental groups, state-level politicians, and many others.
One option for multiple principals would be to simply interpret all the relationships as dyads that resemble principal-agent relationships. Such an interpretation would clearly be incomplete as a result of the externalities problem as well as the limited resources possessed by bureaucracies. With multiple and conflicting principals, bureaucracies have little choice but to act as political institutions and attempt to build some type of coalition that supports policy. A bureaucentric approach (Hill 1991; Lowery 1993) would focus on the strategies and tactics of the bureaucracy as it seeks to establish a coherent policy. The alternative theoretical framework, advocacy coalitions, would treat the bureaucracy as one political actor among many (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) . The advocacy coalition framework, at its base, downplays the hierarchical relationships in a principal-agent model and examines the political relationships among various actors.
The introduction of multiple principals with externalities is certainly problematic for the principal-agent model. Although the model is built around voluntary transactions, it does have a normative element in that principals are supposed to control agents. With the introduction of multiple principals-many if not all with claims of political legitimacy-the principal-agent model offers no clear resolution about which principals should be responded to and which should be ignored. More importantly, unlike the bureaucratic politics or advocacy coalition approaches, it cannot explain actual bureaucratic behavior because it has no way to establish any hierarchical relationships among the principals. From a strict principal-agent framework, bureaucratic behavior in this situation might appear to be random (or even as shirking) yet it easily can be explained by the political goals and resources of various principals and the goals of the bureaucrats.
On another general level, the existence of multiple, competing principals, and quite likely multiple and competing agents as well, means that pure information asymmetry is unlikely to occur. For example, if there are competing principals, then agents, even those with an information asymmetry, would have an incentive to ally themselves with principals who most closely reflect their basic policy goals. In those cases where principals do not share the agents' goals, agents would have a clear incentive to leak information to competing principals. The end result would be a breakdown of a pure information asymmetry. While agents would likely still possess more information than any of their principals, particularly regarding the internal operations of their
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agencies (as opposed to information on the issues), it would not be the pure information asymmetry the traditional model suggests.
The case of competing agents within an agency-of multiple and competing principals within an institution such as Congress or the White House, or the presence of goal conflict within institutions-has also been ignored by the traditional principal-agent model. Indeed, the principal-agent model assumes that both principals and agents are unitary actors: For example, the president is assumed to act as a single unitary actor as is the bureaucracy. The effort is to simplify in order to make the study more tractable.
The unitary actor assumption, along with the dyadic presentation of the principal-agent model, however, violates a great deal of what we know about both political actors and bureaucrats. The consideration of a bureaucracy as a unitary actor has long been rejected by students of bureaucracy (Simon 1947; Downs 1967) . Bureaucracies are composed of individuals with a variety of interests that might not coincide completely with the goals of the organization.' Different professions within an organization might have different policy objectives (Eisner 1992; Quirk 1981; Kelman 1980) . Central office staff might see policy differently from those in the regional office (Waterman, Wright, and Rouse 1994) . Implementation bureaucrats are often at odds with the policy formally promulgated by the agency hierarchy (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983) . Groups of career bureaucrats might see a change in political leadership as an opportunity to reopen old bureaucratic disputes and gain the upper hand on their intraagency rivals (Pfiffner 1988) .
Political institutions also can be viewed as sets of coalitions rather than as single unitary actors. Presidential staff may have interests different from those of the president; the Office of Management and Budget might pursue a policy at odds with the president's stated intent. Congress rarely speaks with a single voice. Individual committees often press for distinctly different goals within a policy area. These different interests are well illustrated by the 1993-1994 health care debates, during which committees provided forums for a variety of interests. Often principal-agent studies equate responsiveness to a committee wim responsiveness to Congress (Mackay, Miller, and Yandle 1987) or simply assume that actions taken in the name of the president are supported by the president. In the first case an incomplete view of the process is presented. That the environmental committees have a principal-agent relationship with the EPA is correct, but so do the energy committees, the small business committees, and several others. None of these committees has a priority claim over the others; all must be considered principals. Similarly, the president is only one person; the institutionalized presidency is a bureaucracy with all the inherent principal-agent problems of a bureaucracy, that is, lower-level personnel may take actions that are not endorsed by the upper reaches of the hierarchy. The ideological consistency of the Reagan presidency, for example, was far more the reflection of Reagan's advisors than of the president (Greider 1984) .
That agents are not unitary actors is most apparent in an agency such as the former Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), since the membership of the Commission had to include both Democrats and Republicans. Because appointments were staggered over time, only two-term presidents were likely to appoint all of the members of an agency such as the ICC. Since appointees hire staff, reorganize units, set budgetary allocations, and so forth, the existence of competing agents within an agency can have important implications for principal-agent relationships as well. Because agents within an agency may not share the same goals, the incentive for leaking and information sharing would likewise increase. Again, the existence of competing agents within an agency would have critically important implications for the principal-agent relationship. Clearly, in the case of multiple principals, multiple agents, and competing agents within an agency, the tendency would be for the bureaucratic model to approximate the advocacy coalition framework rather than a traditional principal-agent relationship.
To this point we have been concerned only with bureaucratic agents and elected political principals. If, however, we add interest groups to the model, the likelihood that an information asymmetry will exist further diminishes. Interest groups, by definition, are interested in a particular policy area. Unless there is goal consensus between interest groups and bureaucrats, interest group members will have a clear incentive to take the information they have derived to other political principals. The arsenal now available to interest groups to uncover so-called hidden information is formidable; it includes the Freedom of Information Act, litigation, and other mechanisms. Likewise, other principals have powerful mechanisms for obtaining hidden information from the bureaucracy. Presidents can employ such techniques as legislative and administrative central clearance and cost-benefit analysis, or they can use the resources of the Office of Management and Budget to acquire information (Waterman 1989) . Similarly, Congress can use its oversight function-the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Budget Office-to acquire information. In summary, the existence of multiple principals and
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Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion? multiple agents (both within and across agencies), all potentially with multiple and often conflicting goals, coupled with the relaxation of the unitary actor assumption, suggests that information asymmetry may not be as common in bureaucratic settings as it would be in the market place. Likewise, goal conflict is likely to vary between agents and their myriad principals-perhaps even within institutions. What are the implications if we alter the assumptions of goal conflict and information asymmetry in the principal-agent model?
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND GOAL CONFLICT AS VARIABLES
We relax the assumptions of information asymmetry and goal conflict in the principal-agent model. We treat these concepts as variables rather than as constants. In the process we also see if more interesting theoretical implications can be derived. To elaborate our criticism of the principal-agent literature, we will also provide substantive examples from the literature.
Information Asymmetry
As we already have noted, the information asymmetry is a critical assumption of the principal-agent model. The information asymmetry is simply the claim that agents possess more information than their principals possess. What type of information do agents possess? Mitnick (1986, 24) wrote that in principal-agent studies in the accounting, finance, and economics literatures there has been "a tendency to ignore the need for precise definitions. Although mathematical applications can clearly substitute in removing potential ambiguities, we sometimes do not really understand the researcher's exact intended meaning in all applications." This criticism is certainly true of information and its application to bureaucratic politics. Surprisingly, little attempt has been made to operationalize this critically important concept. Sometimes references are made to Simon (1947) and the concepts of uncertainty and bounded rationality. But more detailed, operational definitions generally are lacking. There also are inevitable references to Weber's identification of expertise as a foundation of the bureaucracy's power. For example, Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen (1985, 1041) wrote, "Plainly, this expertise gives bureaus strategic opportunities." But what type of expertise do they refer to? The same authors identify the "special insight" that bureaucrats typically possess "into the relation between programs and consequences." In another article (1987, 797) , the same authors add that "bureaucrats rely on expertise based on agenda control, that is, on their ability to manipulate the design of policy alternatives and information about the consequences of alternatives." While programatic or technical expertise is certainly one form of information, it is not the only type. Agents also can gain information advantages from their very proximity to the bureaucracy. The problem of shirking occurs, for example, not because bureaucrats possess detailed technical expertise but because they know about the functioning of their bureaucracy. They can thus lie to superordinates about how diligently they perform their jobs. Hence to some extent agents will indeed have an information advantage over their principals, and some level of shirking is likely to occur. The question for agency theory, however, is how significant will the agent's information advantage be? Clearly, we are not talking about shirking in the sense of an employee spending a few more minutes on coffee break than technically is allowed. We are interested in shirking as it relates to an agency's budgets and its primary functions. In sum, then, like Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen, we are interested in the agent's technical expertise. Although we strongly recommend that our model be replicated to examine the implications of other types of information and expertise (e.g., process, policy, and political expertise), here we will focus on the technical expertise of principals and their agents.
While acknowledging that agents have an information advantage in this realm, these authors also identify the limits of this information asymmetry. They note that legislators also have their own expertise advantages (e.g., regarding the nature of the legislative and agenda setting processes or "authority-based agenda control"). As a result, "politicians are not the only decision makers who must choose in the face of uncertainty." If we focus on policy expertise then it also is clear that principals can acquire offsetting information. As we have noted, legislators can do so from the oversight process; they can acquire information from relevant interest groups, from agents with views that are disparate from those of their bureaucratic superiors, from FOIA requests, and so on. Although agents always may have some information advantages over their principals (they will almost always have a better understanding of how their own agencies operate than will outside principals), when it comes to policy and technical expertise, information asymmetries may or may not exist. We need not conceive of the information asymmetry as a constant in a model; the level of information between principals and agents can vary. In some highly technical fields agents may have more information than their principals have. In other settings, where technical expertise plays a lesser role, the information asymmetry and the "agency problem" should not be apparent. We need to keep this point in mind when we are devising a more generalizable theory of the bureaucracy.
Goal Conflict
In the marketplace, principals and agents clearly have different goals and/or preferences. Obviously, agents want to make as much money as possible while principals want to pay as little as possible for services. But in the bureaucratic setting, with a focus on policy instead of profit, goal conflict may not always exist between principals and agents. Principals and agents may disagree over policy, or they may not. If they do, as Mitnick (1986, 4) noted, principals are forced to "expend resources both in trying to instruct the agent what to do and in monitoring and policing the agent's behavior." If agents have the same policy goals, however, the need for policing and monitoring should logically be reduced (though see Mitnick 1991 for a different view). In such cases, principals would not have to expend resources to instruct the agent about what to do. Consequently, if we treat preferences between principals and agents, or what we call goal conflict/consensus, as a variable with different values rather than as a constant, different types of relationships between principals and agents should become apparent. Our task, therefore, is to combine information (e.g., technical expertise) and goal conflict (as it relates to the policy preferences of principals and agents), as variables, into a more dynamic model of the interaction between principals and their bureaucratic agents.
Combining Information and Goal Conflict into a Generalizable Model
Treating information (e.g., technical expertise) as a variable rather than as a constant really consists of two variables-the information possessed by the agent and the information possessed by the principal. When these variables are arrayed in two dimensions (see exhibit 1), in a dyadic relationship with one principal and one agent only, the standard form of information asymmetry is obviously only one of four possible situations.
2 From exhibit 1, case A exists when both principal and agent possess a great deal of information, case B exists when neither possesses information, case C exists when the principal possesses a great deal of information but the agent does not, and case D exists when the agent possesses a great deal of information and the principal does not. Clearly in some cases (case A) both the principal and the agent are extremely well informed about the process; the health care debate of 1993-1994 had a variety of political principals and bureaucratic agents involved, yet access to information was available to both sets of actors. It is also possible to conceive of situations where both the politicians and the bureaucrats lack information (case B). In The Politics of Sin (1994) , Meier argued that drug policies generally fail because policy-relevant information is not brought to bear: The law enforcement bureaucracies lack the capacity for policy analysis and politicians have little interest in information that contradicts their views of the world. In both case A and B situations information asymmetry does not exist, yet the cases are definitely distinguishable from one another because information appears to be valuable in one and not in me other.
The most interesting possibility is case C, where politicians have substantial information and bureaucrats have little. Such situations exist in large organizations where line bureaucrats perform such specialized jobs that they cannot see how their jobs contribute to what the organizations do. They also exist in some military situations where the agent performs a specified task but only the superordinate or principals know precisely why the task is being performed. In both of these examples only the This example suggests that information asymmetry can be reciprocal between a principal and an agent, with each having superior information about certain elements of the task.
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hierarchical superior (the principal) has the viewpoint from which to see the entire range of operations. In regard to politicians and bureaucrats, such a situation also might exist between politicians directing foreign policy and the military commander of a local naval base. The base commander is exposed to only a small part of the overall foreign policy plan and therefore is at an information disadvantage relative to political superiors. 3 We are not arguing that each of the cells is equally likely to occur. Given the development of administrative capacity and the characteristics of bureaucracy (specialization, professionalization, long time frames, and so forth) bureaucracies are much more likely to gain technical expertise than are politicians (Rourke 1984; Meier 1993) . So cells A and D are probably more likely to occur than are cells B and C, but cases B and C do exist, and we have not recognized this because most principal-agent studies have concentrated on an examination of well-established regulatory agencies at the federal level.
Because economics is based on scarcity and law is based on advocacy, it is inevitable that goal conflict is part of any principal-agent theory. Both disciplines simply assume conflict, and without conflict they would have little to offer theoretically. As we have noted, however, goal conflict can readily be a variable rather than a mere constant. Many relationships are based on cooperation, not conflict, and the same should be true in bureaucratic-political relations (see Johnson 1993) . The failure to consider cooperative relationships between bureaucrats and politics is surprising given its focus on regulatory policy. The major criticism of regulatory policy from the 1930s through the 1960s (and continuing in some cases) was that members of Congress, regulatory bureaucrats, and regulated interests formed cooperative iron triangles that were able to dominate regulatory policy to the exclusion of the general public (Herring 1967; Fellmuth 1970; Lowi 1969; McConnell 1966; Bernstein 1955) . That economic-oriented scholars would not notice this is surprising given that George Stigler's (1970) generalization of this criticism spawned a significant research effort in economics (Posner 1974; Peltzman 1976; MacAvoy 1979; Noll and Owen 1983) and was a key work cited when he was awarded the Nobel prize.
Goal conflict can be combined with information, as we show in exhibit 2. Again we dichotomize the variables for simplicity of presentation, but one could clearly conceptualize information and goal conflict as continuous rather than discrete variables. We will examine this exhibit on a cell by cell basis to demonstrate that these cases actually exist. In the process we will offer some hypotheses based on the various combinations. Case 1: Goal conflict: Principal and agent lack information. This situation occurs when the principal and the agent-or in the case of multiple principals, two or more advocacy coalitions-argue about policy based on ideology. We call this bumper sticker politics. In these cases information is not important to an analysis of the issue at hand and may actually be disregarded. Some likely cases are policies on school prayer, abortion, and m/J-PART, April 1998 perhaps early efforts at school desegregation. In these situations all knowledge is discounted and is, therefore, not part of the debate; it devolves, as in the case of abortion, to such issues as "it's our right" vs. "you're killing babies." This is pure redistributive policy (redistributing values) without any policy information to temper it.
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In such situations bureaucrats really have no productive role to play. If they participate in the political debate, they are one interest among many. Bureaucrats are likely to be distrusted by those on at least one side of the debate; if that side wins effort will be made to remove bureaucrats from the process with symbolic self-implementing policies ("you may pray in school"). In all cases politicians, lacking trust in politicians, will remain active in implementation, with bureaucrats performing the role of clerks. This scenario is more feasible at the local level than at the federal level.
Hypothesis 1:
In situations with goal conflict but where politicians and bureaucrats have little information, the bureaucratic role will become passive and clerical in nature, with principals remaining active in implementation.
Case 2: Goal conflict: Agent has information advantage over prindpaL
This cell represents the classic case of a principalagent relationship. The relationship between President Reagan and most regulatory agencies followed this pattern; in fact, this pattern may be generalizable to many relationships between regulatory agencies and presidents. Since this model is well developed in the research literature (e.g., Wood and Waterman 1994) , and since we have discussed its basic assumptions in detail in this article, we will not present any further hypotheses here.
Case 3: Goal conflict: Both agent and principal have information. In a case like this, bureaucracy becomes one political actor among many; it does not have any claim to sole technical expertise because there is no monopoly on information. In the multiple principal case, the politics in situations like this will resemble advocacy coalitions with bureaucrats (often from different agencies) and politicians aligned together on either side of the issue (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) . In such cases information is important, but the politics is the politics of ideas and information is used in support of those ideas (Derthick and Quirk 1985) . Major disputes in environmental policy (e.g., the Clean Air Act of 1990) and financial deregulation fit this pattern. Bureaucrats, although they might be from different agencies, can be on both sides of a policy dispute-or, if we relax the unitary actor assumption, different factions within an agency can be on different sides of a dispute (see the case of the Energy Department in Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) . This means that bureaucrats will be in a competitive situation with other bureaucrats (law enforcement versus health care in alcohol-related problems; incentives versus command and control in environmental policy). Bureaucrats will have the classic principal-agent relationship with some politicians (those on the other side) and a cooperative relationships with others (those on their side).
Hypothesis 2: In a situation of goal conflict where both principals and agents possess information, relationships with political opponents will fit a principal-agent model, and relationships with political supporters will fit a cooperative model, with the bureaucrats often serving as junior partners. The broader political skills of the bureaucrats become paramount in such relationships since they have to establish supporting coalitions and play off opponents with supporters.
Case 4. Goal conflict: Principals have information, agents do not.
In this situation politicians will dominate any relationship with bureaucrats since politicians have both legitimacy and technical knowledge. Political-bureaucratic relationships in patronage systems (especially in less-developed countries) had these characteristics since bureaucrats were not perceived to have any special technical knowledge (White 1954) . The bureaucracy then serves as personal staff for the politicians. This pattern of relationships is also likely to occur in debates over privatization (any knowledge the bureaucrats have is likely to be discounted as self-serving), occupational regulation reform (e.g., the regulation of barbers and similar occupations), and some civilian-military relationships (where knowledge is conceded only on tactics, not strategy).
Hypothesis 3:
In situations of goal conflict where principals have an information advantage, bureaucrats will act as personal staff to the politicians. Bureaucratic resistance will be limited to the rigid carrying out of policies (that is, administration by rule book).
Case 5. Goal consensus: Principal and agent lack information. In many areas of morality politics, goals are shared, but neither the principal nor the agent has information, or both discount the value of information in the process. Everyone, for example, opposes drunk driving. When such issues become salient, the general strategy is for policy entrepreneurs to grab 'Implementation in these cases can involve discretion; however, that discretion is generally unrelated to overall policy. Meier (1994) has characterized this relationship as a water faucet. Politicians can control the level of bureaucratic output by controlling resources. They do not control which individuals bear the brunt of enforcement, but they do control the level of enforcement. Who will bear the brunt of the enforcement depends on how easy the law is to enforce with respect to different people. The agent will seek to maximize enforcement since this makes both the agent and the principal look good. Easy cases will take precedence over difficult cases; common cases will take precedence over unusual cases. With goal consensus there is little political monitoring of agents; therefore, corruption in enforcement is common.
whatever ideas are floating around and adopt them. This permits the politician to take credit for combatting the problem. Bureaucrats in these policy areas become advocates-or perhaps more harshly, cheerleaders-for the principal's proposed solutions. We perceive that this combination of goal consensus and lack of information characterizes current crime policies, tort reform in small states, drunk driving policy, and drug control efforts (Meier 1988 and .
Case 5 is normatively important because it produces policies that are not informed by policy analysis. As a result, such policies rarely work. The role of the bureaucrat becomes one of expanding and protecting turf, since to question the policy would be to challenge the goal consensus shared with the principal. 4 The only critical information introduced in the debate will come from agents who are not part of the regular policy system.
Hypothesis 4:
In situations with goal consensus, but where neither principals nor agents possess information, the role of the bureaucrat will be passive, with agents supporting the policy proposals of their principals. After policy adoption, the role of the bureaucrat will be to protect turf and implement the principal's policy without questioning it.
Case 6. Goal consensus: Information asymmetry favors agent. When the agent and principal share goals but the agent possesses a great deal of information that the principal does not have, we have the classic case of the politics/administration dichotomy. Khademian (1995) refers to agencies in this position as bottom-line agencies. Agencies are delegated a task with a clear goal and then are simply left alone as long as no major disasters occur. A good example is the farm credit system. The goal-extending credit to the agricultural sector at low but economically sound rates-is shared by the principals (members of Congress) and the agents (the Farm Credit System). Since the implementation of farm credit policies is complex but the success of the agency is readily apparent (total loans, net operating balances), agents are generally left alone by principals. Principals require regular reports, and if nothing is out of line they do nothing. Only if some major problem occurs do the principals intervene and try to take corrective action. Corrections are rare and tend to fix the problem only gradually (Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1994) .
In the bottom-line agency relationship, bureaucrats are technocrats. They are hired for their technical expertise, and the organization is built around the goal shared with the principal.
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Our colleague Dennis Patterson suggests that thii relationship also characterizes most policy making in Japan, with long ties between Liberal Democratic politicians and members of the bureaucracy. The Liberal Democratic party reinforces such relationships by recruiting candidates from the ranks of the bureaucracy. We suspect that additional cases for each of the eight cells can be found in comparative administration.
Unless the agent tries to shift the blame during periods of crisis, none of the common principal-agent problems occur. This pattern of relationships fits many government corporations, federal deposit insurance, and perhaps antitrust policy under President Reagan (Wood and Anderson 1993) . Bureaucracies dominate these policy areas by inertia and expertise (akin to the automatic control systems on an oil tanker), but when something goes wrong politicians come to the bridge and yank on the tiller. They then go back to the party deck and wait to see if something happens.
Hypothesis 6: In areas with goal consensus but information asymmetry that favors the agent, bureaucrats will become technocrats and form relationships with principals that resemble those of the classical politics-administration dichotomy.
Case 7. Goal consensus: Principal and agent share information. The scenario with goal consensus and principal and agent sharing substantial information is, in a multiple principal model, the classic policy subsystem. Goals are shared with little challenge as long as all members of the subsystem can be kept reasonably happy. Such relationships require a repeat games situation with principals and agents interacting over long periods of time. As a result, the case 7 scenario is likely to develop in relationships between Congress and the bureaucracy, but it develops rarely in cases with the president and the bureaucracy. Principals also need diis long tenure to develop the technical expertise necessary to participate in the process as peers with the agents.
Case 7 describes the situation for most agriculture agencies and their relationship with Congress (Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1995) . Some might refer to this situation as one of congressional dominance, but that misrepresents what are essentially symbiotic relationships between members of Congress and the career bureaucracy. The influence should be regarded more as reciprocal than congressional dominance, since a new majority in Congress would have a difficult time reversing this relationship. Witness the persistence of the agricultural policy subsystem despite the dramatic decline in the number of members of Congress from agricultural districts (Browne 1988) . Other possible areas where case 7 might describe the political bureaucratic relationships are those of health research, agricultural research, and similar distributive policy areas.
Bureaucrats will share goals with members of Congress, and discretion will be granted to the bureaucracy as a result of trust. Monitoring will occur incidental to the continual process of consulting.
Case 8. Goal consensus: The principal has information but the agent does not. Cases where the principal has technical information but the agent does not are perceived to be rare in contemporary federal policy. An example at the national level would be in military situations and perhaps with intelligence agencies, where intelligence operatives share goals with their principals (e.g., anticommunism) but are not aware of all of the details of the big picture. At local levels, bureaucracies rarely have the expertise or the administrative capacity that the federal bureaucracies do, so it is quite possible to have agents at the local level with an information disadvantage relative to principals. A city manager or a strong mayor governing a small city could be in this situation. It perhaps fits best the governing system in Plato's Republic. The Republic had few laws with universal application; implementation problems were thus minimized and all citizens were expected to participate actively in the city's political life. In such situations, principals should become experts, philosopher kings; agents in such a situation could even be slaves.
This situation could well fit relationships that exist in small homogeneous cities. When they address such issues as nude dancing, parking meters on main street, low property taxes, dog licensing laws, and so forth, the principals are likely to have all the information necessary to make public policy. Agents, if there are any, have limited discretion and simply carry out the policies established by the principals. Shirking is the only agency problem that might occur, since goal consensus exists.
Hypothesis 8: Situations with goal consensus where principals have information but agents do not are most likely to occur in polities with little administrative capacity. In such situations, the relationship between the principal and the agent will be similar to the relationship between the philosopher king and his/her serfs.
By treating information and goal conflict as variables rather than as constants we have established a model that is generalizable; that is, we can now explain a variety of possible relationships between principals and agents. This is important for several reasons. Principal monitoring of bureaucratic agents, and the costs associated with it, plays a central role in the principal-agent framework. Yet the need for monitoring, and the costs associated with it, should decline either in those cases in which goal conflict does not exist or in those cases in which principals possess information. In these cases the classic "agency problem" has been solved. But as our model demonstrates, the agency problem is not generalizable to all bureaucratic settings or all relationships between principals and agents. While the identification of the agency problem is important, it is also important to devise a more generalizable model of bureaucratic politics that includes situations in which the agency problem does not dominate. If generalizability is our goal, we need to specify the widest range of possible interactions between principals and agents.
The Implications of Our Model for Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Having presented eight cases in which information is exchanged between principals and agents, and in which goal conflict varies, we now can ask a fundamental question: What are the implications of our model for political control of the bureaucracy? As we have noted, it is obvious that we can hypothesize that many different relationships exist between principals and agents. This may not at first appear to be a startling finding, but when we peruse the bureaucratic literature we find a tendency for scholars to adopt one model of bureaucratic politics at a time, to the exclusion of all others. For example, at one time the politicsadministration dichotomy was the ruling paradigm in the bureaucratic literature. When evidence began to accumulate that there was indeed politics in administration, however, scholars abandoned this theory in favor of the iron triangle and capture theories. Similarly, when evidence began to mount that suggested the entire bureaucratic process could not be explained in terms of iron triangles, scholars again shifted ground and rejected that theory in favor of the principal-agent model. 6 There is some evidence that advocacy coalitions may be developing as the next theoretical flavor of the month. Consequently, theories have appeared, with paradigm shifts occurring periodically over time, as scholars reject one long-held approach for yet another.
Yet our model suggests that such discrete thinking regarding models of the bureaucratic process is simplistic. Just as there are other possible information relationships between principals and agents than the traditional information asymmetry, different theories of the bureaucratic process are likely to hold simul-,_ . , . . Acknowledging the need for a more generalizable theory of political control, we can now ask a second question: When are attempts at political control of the bureaucracy most likely to occur? The assumption that agents actively employ their information advantages to shirk principal attempts at hierarchical control implies at least that agents exert some level of bureaucratic discretion (see our discussion above of the principal-agent model). They must by definition have discretion in order to shirk. Furthermore, scholars (e.g., Lowi 1969) have argued that bureaucratic discretion undermines attempts at overhead democracy. If there is such a direct connection between political control and bureaucratic discretion, then we also can ask, Under which circumstances is bureaucratic discretion most likely to occur?
In four of the cases presented in exhibit 2 bureaucratic discretion should be severely limited. In cases 4 and 8 discretion is limited because the information asymmetry favors the principal. Consequently, principals easily can dominate the political relationship and limit bureaucratic discretion. In cases 1 and 5, both principals and agents have limited information, and the role of the agent is hypothesized to be confined to either a clerk or a cheerleader for the principal's policies. Both cases suggest a largely passive bureaucracy with limited bureaucratic discretion. We can further state that in cases 1 and 5 the need for political control largely is mitigated by the hypothesized passive nature of the bureaucracy itself. Thus bureaucratic discretion and the need for principal attempts at political control of the bureaucracy should not be problematical in the four cases presented on the left side of exhibit 2.
In the four cases on the right side of exhibit 2, however, we hypothesize that agents are capable of exerting considerable, if varying, levels of bureaucratic discretion. Discretion, in large part, results from the agent's greater access to information. Thus bureaucratic discretion should present its greatest threat to hierarchical control shown on the right side of exhibit 2 (cases 2, 3, 6 and 7). But does the mere potential for bureaucratic discretion necessarily signify that agents will shirk attempts at political control? In cases 6 and 7 there is goal consensus between principals and agents over policy. If there is general agreement on policy goals, then the need for political control of the bureaucracy should be greatly obviated. For example, for what purpose would a principal exert precious political resources to control an agency that already agrees with the principal's basic policy objectives? Obviously, principals would have little incentive to exert control, and agents would have little incentive to take policy in a direction that did not conform to either their own or their principal's basic objectives. Consequently, the necessity of principal attempts at political control would be greatly obviated in any case in which goal consensus between principals and agents is high.
In short, political control of the bureaucracy should be facilitated when goal consensus is high (cases 5, 6, 7, and 8), when bureaucratic discretion is limited (cases 1, 4, 5, and 8), or when principals possess greater information than their agents (cases 4 and 8). Only two cases remain (cases 2 and 3) in which political control of the bureaucracy should be actively contested on a regular basis. In these cases principals and agents are in conflict, bureaucratic discretion exists, and either principals and agents possess a great deal of information (case 3) or agents have an information advantage over their principals (case 2). We can further assert that of these two cases, the most problematical for political control of the bureaucracy should be case 2, because agents possess more information than their principals. Case 2, of course, represents the assumptions of the traditional principalagent model. . . , clientele is different stuT^ere are major *e greatest incentive and the greatest ability to avoid hierarchical issues concerning how responsive some of control. In this sense, then, it is probably the most interesting the relationships are to majoritirian case to explain. notions of democracy (see Redford 1969; Meier 1993 
CONCLUSION
Principal-agent models are supposed to be dynamic, not static. They characterize relationships that develop and evolve. The defining features of the dynamics of political bureaucratic relationships are information and goal conflict. Political actors, whether politicians or bureaucrats, learn over time about both policy and politics; all institutions also develop some capacity over time. This change in the pattern of information has the potential to move a relationship from one cell of our base model to another. The introduction of information in some cases even may have the impact of changing goals as policies demonstrate that certain approaches are or are not effective. The dynamic contribution of information suggests why some policies evolve over time (those where information is valuable) and why other policies simply repeat past mistakes (those where information is discounted).
Based on the implications of our model, we propose that the principal-agent model needs to be expanded. The model does adequately explain certain situations that exist between principals and their agents. That said, however, our model suggests that the principal-agent model is not a generalizable explanation for the myriad relationships that actually exist between principals and agents in the bureaucratic world. It examines but one of many different relationships between principals and agents. Furthermore, it may not be nearly as prevalent as scholars have led us to believe. As we consider the possibility of both multiple principals and agents, and as we relax the unitary actor assumption, we find that information sharing (for different reasons) may be more common between even regulatory bureaucracies and their political principals than previously has been assumed. In addition, goal conflict over policy is not always present. In summary, while the principal-agent model raises interesting questions for the study of political control of the bureaucracy, it is far from a generalizable model of bureaucratic politics.
We have offered an alternative to the traditional principalagent model. By arguing that information and goal conflict are not constants, but rather continuous variables in a bureaucratic model, we believe we have laid the basic groundwork for the development of a more generalizable theory of bureaucratic politics. It is one that allows us to include the often mundane and perfunctory relationships that can and do exist between many principals and agents in bureaucratic settings. But it also acknowledges that the bureaucratic process can be highly political and conflictual. We do not for a moment contend that our model is complete. Our acknowledgement that there can be goal conflict between agents within a single bureaucracy raises yet another possible modification of the model presented in exhibit 2. Still, as a starting point, we believe we have credibly argued that the bureaucratic process is much more complex, much more dynamic, and much more interesting than prior research has indicated. At the same time, the complexity and the dynamics can be clustered into a modest number of logically related cases to facilitate research.
In addition, the model presented in exhibit 2 has a certain symmetry to it that suggests a more generalizable model. On the left side of the model, we anticipate that bureaucratic discretion will be limited. On the right side, as the agents' access to information increases discretion should likewise increase. In the lower half of the model, goal consensus indicates that there will likely be less conflict between principals and agents. In the upper half of the model, conflict over goals will be more intense. Combining bureaucratic discretion and goal conflict, we further argue that political control of the bureaucracy will be more problematical in case 2 and 3 situations, as is shown in the top and right of exhibit 2.
Additionally, the upper and lower halves of the model have a symmetry that may not be obvious at first. For example, case 3 situations, involving high levels of information for both principals and agents, as well as high levels of conflict, suggest a group dynamic (e.g., advocacy coalitions). In the comparable situation without conflict, case 7, the group dynamic remains, but in this case it reflects a more consensual iron triangle relationship. Likewise, cases 2 and 6 are symmetrical. Case 2, the traditional principal-agent model, is by far the most conflictual-one could even say the most political. Case 6, on the other hand, is the least conflictual and the least political. On the left side of the figure, cases 4 and 8 exhibit a similar symmetry. In case 4, where principals possess a great deal of information and agents do not and where goal conflict is present, agents are passive, acting largely as staff to principals. In case 8, given similar circumstances but without goal conflict, agents are again passive, but this time they operate more as willing supporters of their principals because the conflict between principals and agents has been removed. In cases 1 and 5 principals and agents possess little information. When goal conflict exists (case 1), bureaucrats are again passive and clerical in nature. When goal conflict is removed (case 5) bureaucrats, while again largely passive in nature, now operate as cheerleaders or enthusiastic supporters of the principals' goals (i.e., willingly promoting the principals' policies).
While we have presented the eight cases in exhibit 2 as discrete situations, in reality we believe the model is more continuous than discrete in nature. For heuristic purposes we found it easier to present the cases in discrete terms. In reality, we see information and goal conflict/consensus as operating on a continuum. Agents never have all of the information, and principals never lack all of the information. A continuous formulation better captures the dynamics of the bureaucratic process. Our fundamental point is that as the level of an agent's or principal's information either increases or decreases, and as the level of conflict either increases or decreases, we expect that the political relationships between the two sets of actors will change as well.
Finally, while we have presented eight cases, we do not mean to suggest that relationships between principals and agents will always be characterized by the same case. In fact, a key component of the dynamics of our model is the idea that relationships between principals and agents can change over time. For example, the relationship between principals and agents in the airline and motor carrier industries (the CAB and the ICC) was, for many years, best described as a case 7 situation. With the introduction of deregulation in the 1970s, however, the situation quickly evolved into a case 3 situation. Understanding how the politics in these cases was altered is, we believe, one of the principal (no pun intended) strengths of our approach.
